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Abstract: In 2012, plans were announced to develop a large-scale mixed-use wa-
terfront project along the Sava River in central Belgrade. Within 30 years, the 
80-hectare site is projected to contain the region’s largest shopping mall, alongside 
thousands of square metres of luxury apartments and high-end offices. Promises 
of a 3.5 billion euro investment from the United Arab Emirates associated with 
this real estate development project quickly led to polemical interactions and ten-
sions between the plan’s supporters and critics. Based on a variety of qualitative 
methods, including in-depth interviews conducted in Belgrade, Dubai and Abu 
Dhabi, we will outline the strategies and actions that key actors and stakeholders 
undertook, particularly during the project’s early implementation phase in 2015 
and 2016. We will illustrate how these interactions and tensions between and 
among the actors took place on and across different scales. Prior to empirical in-
vestigation of confrontational actor-relations, the paper will concisely discuss how 
Belgrade Waterfront fits into a wider global trend of “world city entrepreneurial-
ism” and associated state rescaling processes. On that basis, the paper will then 
focus on how this transnational real estate development project, despite claims 
that it will increase competitiveness and employment, came to be perceived as a 
potential threat by its opponents (who assume that it will trigger uneven develop-
ment and functions as a catalyst for authoritarianism). This brings us to the fo-
cal point of the contesting voices and actions arrayed against this project, which 
revolves primarily around claims that the “public” are being excluded during its 
implementation.
Keywords: Belgrade Waterfront, world-city entrepreneurialism, real estate de-
velopment, power relations
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Introduction
“Eagle Hills develops flagship city destinations 
that invigorate aspiring nations, [h]elping countries raise 
their global profiles to new heights” 
(Eagle Hills, 2014)
“Belgrade Waterfront takes urban renewal 
to new heights – a smart city for a future that 
combines commerce, culture and community”
(Eagle Hills, 2014).
The above quotes are just two examples of the many catchy procla-
mations with which readers were confronted in the original official bro-
chure of the “modern centre of excellence”, presented to the public shortly 
after the project was announced. Belgrade Waterfront (BW) is a transna-
tional real estate development project in Serbia’s capital that is currently 
being realized on a mostly derelict, yet centrally located site along the 
river Sava, to the rear of the city’s 19th century central railway station. 
Within 30 years, the site, covering almost 80 hectares, is intended to con-
tain a 200-metre-tall tower, a large shopping mall and mixed-use spaces 
for working, living and leisure. The project, which has taken shape as a 
joint venture between a United Arab Emirates (UAE) based investor and 
the Republic of Serbia, has caused significant controversy and brought 
rise to struggles between different socio-cultural actors representing a va-
riety of scalar positions and hierarchies. The overblown ambitions and 
promises that accompanied promotional activities during the project’s 
early implementation phase attracted the attention not only of potentially 
interested investors and buyers, as was intended, but also that of a variety 
of (local and international) journalists and academics, who more often 
than not placed particular emphasis on the concerns of critical voices op-
posed to the project.
Indeed, the case of Belgrade Waterfront offers a unique opportunity 
for scholarly reflection from multiple interesting analytical angles. Re-
searchers have thus far focused on four areas: the role and strategies of 
actively resisting social movements (e.g. Matković & Ivković, 2018); the 
public interest and participation or the lack thereof (Lalović et al., 2015); 
changing institutional frameworks (Zeković, Maričić & Vujošević, 2016) 
and the active, top-down role of (those acting on behalf of) the state 
(Grubbauer & Čamprag, 2019; Koelemaij, 2018); and finally the displace-
ment of informal settlements (Stanković, 2016). Our goal in this paper is 
to integrate those insights, and to reconstruct the early days of Belgrade 
Waterfront by adopting an agency-focused, relational analytical approach.
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The main intention is to reflect upon existing power relations behind 
the project while assessing to what extent it is possible to speak of “sca-
lar hierarchies” in this particular context. Additionally, we will evaluate 
strategies adopted by the project’s main stakeholders and the underly-
ing rationales they serve. In order to do so, we have conducted in-depth 
interviews with numerous stakeholders who were closely involved with 
the project, either directly or indirectly. Our respondents can be identi-
fied both as supporters, who personally or professionally approve of the 
project, and as opponents, who disapprove of the project for a variety of 
reasons and from a variety of backgrounds. Additionally, city and nation-
al-level policy documents relating to the project or to spatial planning in 
general were extensively analysed.
Due to on-going changes to the project’s design and legal status, as 
well as the constantly shifting frontline between opposing and support-
ing actors, this chapter is confined to the project’s early implementa-
tion phase: from the summer of 2014 to the summer of 2016. Taking an 
agency-focused approach as essential to obtaining insights into the social, 
economic and political dimensions behind global urban policy-making, 
we set forth from three main research questions. In short, we aim to ex-
ploratively reveal which actors act on behalf of which structures and insti-
tutions, to observe how they act and to understand why they act the way 
they do. This approach allows us to engage with on-going debates in the 
academic literature that question the notion of state rescaling as it pertains 
to world city-entrepreneurial projects (e.g. Golubchikov, 2010), as well as 
with the generally accepted logic behind speculative urbanism in so-called 
frontier capital markets.
Prior to presenting the Belgrade Waterfront project in more detail, 
Section 1 will briefly discuss how the term “world city entrepreneurial-
ism” has been understood thus far. Subsequently, in Section 2, we ex-
plain and justify the methodology employed. Section 3 discusses the 
main events relating to the launch of Belgrade Waterfront and the reac-
tions and tensions the announcement triggered, as well as identifying the 
key actors and groups who have raised their voices against the project. 
Similarly, Section 4 reveals how actors on the other side of the frontline 
have defended and justified the project. In Section 5 we analytically dis-
cuss the power relations between these different actors, which attitudes 
and interactions accompany their positions and how this relates to the 
scales on and across which they operate. In the concluding section, we 
argue that the main incentives for all of the involved stakeholders are, 
to a greater or lesser extent, to gain symbolic capital from the Belgrade 
Waterfront project.
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1. World City Entrepreneurialism
and its Speculative Urban Practices
When David Harvey (1989) wrote his seminal paper on urban entre-
preneurialism, he first and foremost expressed concerns on how the in-
creasing focus on inter-urban competition not only led to changing trends 
in urban governance and policy but also that this new fashion had mac-
roeconomic consequences. Public-private partnerships facilitating specu-
lative urban development projects became a widespread phenomenon in 
North American cities from the early 1980s onwards. Harvey noted that 
this new type of boosterism implied that local governments often took 
on the financial risks, while the private sector took the benefits. In what 
proved to be prescient, Harvey (1989, p. 10) further noted that one of the 
features of urban entrepreneurialism would be that “it may even force re-
petitive and serial reproduction of certain patterns of development (such 
as the serial reproduction of ‘world trade centres’ or of new cultural and 
entertainment centres, of waterfront development, of post-modern shop-
ping malls, and the like)”.
In the three decades that have passed since, numerous studies have 
shown that urban entrepreneurialism is not only a US phenomenon. 
Moreover, inter-urban competition has been upscaled and, since the be-
ginning of the new century, it appears to have become fashionable for 
many urban policymakers across the globe to try to put their city “on the 
map” through city marketing campaigns and flagship architecture, in or-
der to improve the city’s so-called global status. While it started out as a 
critical academic concept (Sassen, 1991, see also Van Meeteren, Derudder 
& Bassens, 2016), the global city has in recent years increasingly become 
an aspirational category, due to the growing influence of transnational 
consultancy firms in global policy-making, as is frequently highlighted 
in the burgeoning policy mobilities literature (e.g. Prince, 2012). Accord-
ing to Leon (2017), who describes this trend as “municipal mercantilism”, 
such interventions require an active state (contrary to neoliberal assump-
tions) and they reinforce class relations.
Although similar observations about the active role of the state in ur-
ban entrepreneurial projects are now being more widely recognized, the 
key question remains precisely which state actors are to be most involved. 
Framed differently: “which actors act on behalf of the state?”. It seems that 
in most cases, urban entrepreneurial projects in “emerging” or “develop-
ing” economies, particularly larger scale projects, still rely on the close in-
volvement of central, national-level governments (Golubchikov, 2010). It 
is they who often initiate and facilitate boosterist policies with the aim of 
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eventually asserting the political elite’s power position. Policies and pro-
jects such as these often have a very speculative and experimental char-
acter, meaning that the financial outcomes are uncertain, thus involving 
high-risks where public money is involved (Goldman, 2011; Goodfellow, 
2017; Lauermann, 2018). This is a phenomenon that has thus far mainly 
been witnessed in the Global South, namely the Middle East (Acuto, 2010; 
Wippel et al., 2014), Asia (Ong, 2011; Olds & Yeung, 2004) and Africa 
(Watson, 2013). When a world city entrepreneurial project is also being 
facilitated by foreign capital, such as in the case of Belgrade Waterfront, 
an interesting additional layer is added in terms of governance dynamics. 
What makes such cases particularly interesting is that while both the pro-
viding foreign or “global” investor and the receiving “domestic” govern-
ment share some similar goals, their respective incentives and rationales 
for becoming involved in these kinds of projects can simultaneously differ.
2. Doing Global Urban Research Relationally:
A Matter of Methods
In the same year that Harvey published his urban entrepreneurialism 
paper, Manuel Castells (1989) came up with his concept of the (global) 
“space of flows”, arguing that spaces and cities are continuously being pro-
duced by what (transnationally) flows through them. This epistemological 
shift implies an almost unequivocal compliance with the coexistence of 
multiple spatial arrangements (Löw, 2016; Low, 2017; Janković, 2015) – 
inter alia, subtracting the assumed fixity of spatial affairs. It has addition-
ally inspired many urban studies scholars who have since applied those 
conceptual thoughts in a variety of ontological ways, ranging from the 
more structural (e.g. Taylor & Derudder, 2015) to post-structural and as-
semblage approaches (e.g. Jacobs, 2012; Allen, 2016; Amin & Thrift, 2017) 
and everything in between (e.g. McCann & Ward, 2010). With the inten-
tion of comprehending the global networks and negotiations that underlie 
Belgrade Waterfront, and thus of focusing on the geographies of govern-
ance behind the project, our approach endeavours to combine a political 
economic narrative with insights derived from some useful elements of 
topological and assemblage analyses. In line with Büdenbender and Gol-
ubchikov (2017, p. 81), our “take on assemblages is more tactical than on-
tological” and is thus located somewhere in between the sharp divides, as 
it acknowledges the existence of structured realities whilst concurrently 
seeking to trace how they are composed. While allowing us to find out 
how state authority is being socially constructed through the role of dif-
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ferent actors and materialities (see Allen & Cochrane, 2010; Sassen, 2008), 
this approach enables us also to assess how different scales are socially 
constructed through relationalities (Massey, 2005). The major advan-
tage of this approach is that it makes possible to discern the mechanisms 
through which world city entrepreneurialism operates, while also taking 
into account the various and often-conflicting tonalities that actors dis-
play in relation to this project.
Thus, rather than force our observations into neat and harmonious 
patterns, we intended to extract as much as possible from the recent res-
toration of processual thinking (e.g. Abbott, 2016) and “agency-driven” 
methodological prescriptions. If the maxim proposed by Desmond (2014, 
p. 565), “processes live in relations”, is truly adopted it then appears nec-
essary to reject the view of (collective) actors as “culturally bounded”, al-
lowing them instead to create boundaries through conflict permeated by 
a distinct moral grammar and interpretative strategies. Such methodologi-
cal approaches make it possible to retrieve the enduring pursuit of power, 
recognition and resources that exists within urban affairs and particularly 
in defining “public space” (Vigneswaran, Iveson & Low, 2017). Still, the 
focus set on the field where these relations enmesh, seeks to go beyond 
merely registering relevant actors and aims to discern the very rationale 
of action or involvement. As Hoyler and Harrison (2018) state in their 
concluding remarks in the recent edited volume, Doing Global Urban 
Research, a trend towards agency-focused research has indeed helped in 
sharpening analytical lenses. Namely, they argue that having asked and an-
swered the “who-questions”, “questions that begin with ‘what’ and ‘where’ 
will help you define the scale and scope of their agentic role in the global 
urban; those starting with ‘how’ will allow you to uncover the strategies 
and mechanisms that enable the actor(s) to fulfil this role; and ‘why’ ques-
tions will help to unpack their motivations and interests” (p. 227).
To unravel exactly these research questions regarding the Belgrade 
Waterfront project, we have made use of a variety of qualitative research 
methods and conducted fieldwork research at different locations. Between 
August 2015 and August 2016, we conducted 14 in-depth interviews with 
a total of 21 stakeholders in Belgrade, including politicians, consultants, 
civil servants, journalists, academics, activists and businessmen. In the se-
lection procedure we aimed to find a balance regarding their pro or con-
tra attitudes to the project. In every interview we asked the respondent 
to not only reflect upon their own involvement regarding the Belgrade 
Waterfront project but also to share their knowledge with us on what they 
thought about the power relations and motivations behind certain actions. 
In this way we were able to familiarize ourselves with whatever took place 
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“behind the frontline” of the project but it also allowed us to better under-
stand why it is that the different opposing groups make use of different 
strategic discourses. The insights that we derived from this collected ma-
terial was supplemented by thorough analysis of several policy documents 
(mainly issued by the Republic of Serbia and the City of Belgrade), as well 
as advertising brochures issued by the Belgrade Waterfront Company. Ad-
ditionally, during the spring of 2018, 13 interviews were conducted with 
real estate development experts in Dubai, Abu Dhabi, London and Am-
sterdam. Some of these provided us with important insights into how 
UAE-based developers generally perceive transnational real estate devel-
opment activities.
In the remainder of this paper, we will gradually construct our con-
cluding arguments according to the “show, don’t tell-principle”. A relative-
ly large number of quotes will be shared, not only to make the text more 
vibrant but even more so to illustrate the actor-perspective in practice as 
accurately and as authentically as possible.
3. A New Skyline for Belgrade:
The Main Criticisms
The introduction to this chapter reveals some of the main character-
istics of Belgrade Waterfront or at least how it was presented during its 
first announcements in 2013 and 2014. According to Radosavljević (2008), 
the Amphitheatre site, on which Belgrade Waterfront is being constructed, 
has for quite some time been regarded as a site that could potentially yield 
political and societal support for ruling political elites. Over the past cen-
tury, there had been several plans and proposals to develop this centrally 
located site but they remained unimplemented for various reasons. This 
situation changed from the moment that Aleksandar Vučić rose to power, 
from his becoming deputy prime minister in 2012, prime minister in 2014 
and eventually president of the Republic of Serbia in 2017. During earlier 
electoral campaigns, he assured voters that he had found a foreign investor 
that was willing to help the country to finally develop the mainly unused 
site along the Sava River, and thus to contribute to the city’s “global profile”.
During 2014, large billboards and advertising exhibition spaces show-
ing a model of BW emerged throughout Belgrade’s city centre, attracting a 
lot of attention, from journalists, architects, activists and academics, both 
domestic and international. Another factor that contributed to the profile 
of the project was, as has already been mentioned, the striking amount 
of foreign direct investment (purportedly €3.5 billion) that was quickly 
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emphasised by those directly involved. Moreover, Vučić himself, the prime 
minister at that time, and Siniša Mali, then mayor of Belgrade and a mem-
ber of the same political party as Vučić, often acted as a spokespersons 
and ambassadors for the project. From the investor’s side, the well-known 
real estate developer, Mohammed Alabbar, who has been the chairman 
of Dubai-based developer Emaar Properties for over a decade, presented 
himself as the man behind the project. It is known that Alabbar has close 
ties to Dubai’s long-time ruler, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Mak-
toum, while also being a member of the Dubai Executive Council, a posi-
tion that gives him a voice in the country’s economic, geo-economic and 
political strategies – something we will return to at the end of this chapter.
As has already been indicated, initial reactions to the presentation of 
the BW model were generally fairly sceptical and critical. Accusations of 
perceived corruption and naivety behind the project went hand in hand 
with those stressing a mismatch between such an “elite-serving” project 
and the apparent lack of demand for it. The actual motivations behind the 
project remained largely opaque. The extent to which BW would serve the 
“public interest” thus quickly became a central issue. While urban theory 
has consistently emphasised the politics of dissent (e.g. Smith, 2005), it 
has hardly been “engaging directly with the ongoing discord that is a char-
acteristic of many urban political contexts” (Phelps & Valler, 2018: 83). 
Generally speaking, the project was opposed from its earliest moments 
predominantly by urban civil society groups such as activists, profession-
als (journalists, architects and urban planners with links to NGOs), aca-
demics and opposition politicians. A shared social commonality among 
these actors is either their privileged academic careers or the rich profes-
sional experience they were able to garner in fields such as architecture, 
planning or journalism. This common ground helped shape the bulk of 
the criticism levelled at the project itself. We identified six main points 
that nearly all of the “opposing stakeholders” advanced during our field-
work. These were: 1) the top-down way in which the project had been 
imposed upon them; 2) the illogical design and “inverted” implementa-
tion of the project; 3) the project’s elite-serving and supposedly “exclusive” 
elements; 4) the neglect of existing planning laws and regulations; 5) the 
lack of transparency regarding planning details and the amount of public 
money that was involved; and 6) allegations regarding personal enrich-
ment, money laundering and/or corruption.
The fact that the ruling political elites in Serbia and Belgrade “in-
stantly” came up with an investor and almost immediately presented a 
model frustrated many of the aforementioned groups. Two representatives 
of the activist initiative Ne da(vi)mo Beograd (which means We Won’t Let 
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Belgrade D(r)own in English) with whom we spoke indicated that they 
found it worrisome that there had not been any international competition 
for the design of the project, as required by Serbian law. As an opposition 
politician from the City Assembly stressed:
“It is not possible that the mayor, or anybody, decides alone. This is 
what Tito did and Hitler and Stalin and Mao Zedong, but [this can] 
not [happen] today. There is an obligation to conduct an international 
competition, [to look] for architectural solutions” (Opposition politi-
cian, City Assembly).
While a public hearing was organised in 2014, during which citizens 
were invited to come up with alternative ideas or solutions, several of our 
respondents were convinced that all alternative proposals had been ignored:
“Nobody asks the municipality anything... Only if we have, when they 
change some urban plans, all Serbian citizens can give their suggestions; 
municipalities can also give their suggestions but, you know, nobody 
takes them into consideration” (Municipal Architect, Savski venac).
The top-down implementation of the project was reaffirmed by em-
ployees of the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade, who admitted that 
their role in it was fairly limited:
“It was on the state level. It was on the top level. It was on the level of 
the prime minister, I think, so it was something that had been decided 
before our [Master] plan.” (Civil Servant, Urban Planning Institute).
Furthermore, it was not surprising that immediate and uncompro-
mising criticism of the project’s Master Plan came mainly from members 
of the Serbian Academy of Architecture. Apart from disapproval based on 
personal taste, they mainly disregarded the design as being “childish” and 
“empty”, while they highlighted the lack of integration into the city’s wider 
urban fabric – such as, for instance, in terms of issues relating to mobility. 
All in all, it seemed to them as though the plan had been simply copy-
pasted from previous developments in the UAE, although the people from 
the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade denied this. As one of our re-
spondents, an emeritus professor who also held positions in public spatial 
planning agencies, put it:
“Of course, what we saw was really funny. No studies [had been done]. 
No feasibility studies, no calculations. Nothing. It is just for small chil-
dren, you know. [They] prepared some nice pictures and put two sen-
tences under each picture, and that was all. The city, the state, they have 
[communicated] nothing about controlling financial, economic or eco-
logical implications or whatever” (Urban Planning Consultant).
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In line with that, many opponents of the project expressed concerns 
that BW failed to follow normal planning procedures:
“[...] usually, like in any state in the world I think, the first steps are to 
make a plan, to discuss it with stakeholders, to adopt the plan, to make 
it official, then to make a project, then to get construction permits and 
then to do marketing, yeah? But here, everything was mixed. First there 
was the model, then the project, then the plan” (Municipal Urban Plan-
ner and Consultant).
While these criticisms almost unanimously tackled the developers’ 
lack of professional competence and deviation from standard procedure, 
they also displayed a renewed commitment to shaping public spaces and 
the possibilities thereof (Vigneswaran, Iveson & Low, 2017). The third 
main point of criticism was mainly ideological and referred to the exclu-
sionary nature of building an elite-serving waterfront project which com-
prises only luxury apartments, retail and office space. Many respondents 
ridiculed the conspicuous lack of feasibility studies and, more importantly, 
expressed serious doubts – based on the rather limited size of the Serbian 
real estate market – about whether there would be sufficient interest in 
the large quantity of residential and office space proposed. Despite all the 
rhetoric on increasing competitiveness and employment, opponents have 
seen it as a potential threat, assuming that the project will trigger une-
ven development and act as a catalyst for authoritarianism. These worries 
were mainly expressed by activists with links to Ne da(vi)mo Beograd. 
Although the BW site had indeed been derelict for decades, a number of 
abodes remained, the inhabitants of which had to be relocated when the 
site was cleared in preparation for construction. Although government 
representatives argued that these domiciles were “illegal anyway” and 
that they had been generous in offering compensation to the inhabitants 
so they could relocate, many of our respondents had their doubts about 
whether the relocations were socially just:
“Everything there was... not state-owned, it was publically owned... It 
was a system in former Yugoslavia, so you were a shareholder in your 
company and then the company would give you an apartment. And 
they got a promise and they got the apartment in the beginning of the 
1990s, but then the civil war happened and everything, households, 
went to the private sector and stuff like that” (Activist 1).
“...But they were not illegal, that’s important. They just needed to trans-
form from that form of ownership to the new one. So, they had the 
right to live there, given to them by the railway company. So yes, they 
are not the owners of this place but they are not illegal. They live there” 
(Activist 2).
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In addition to this, all of the opposing groups stated that the implied 
price of housing in BW would result in a sharp mismatch with the average 
income in Belgrade and would thus be unaffordable for the vast majority 
of people:
“We have so much office space here in Belgrade that is actually empty. 
And you cannot rent it or sell it or... So, who is going to come to rent 
an office here? Or to buy an office, or to buy an apartment? Who? The 
salary here in Belgrade is around 450 euros per month. In [the rest of] 
Serbia it is 350. It’s... impossible to imagine...” (Urban Planning Con-
sultant).
Apart from the supposed lack of demand for so much high-end resi-
dential and office space, several respondents indicated that they were afraid 
the project would become too much akin to a gated community, lacking 
public space and essentially rendering the Sava riverbanks private space. 
Probably the fiercest point of criticism related to the alleged illegality of 
the proposed plans and the fact that new laws were introduced in order to 
meet the developers’ needs. In 2015, the Serbian government declared the 
project to be of “national importance”, which justified pursuing a so-called 
Lex Specialis (Službeni glasnik RS, 7/15) – i.e. a special law that would ap-
ply only to BW and which overrules existing laws regarding planning per-
mission, while simultaneously serving as a permit allowing construction 
to begin. As a result of the Lex Specialis, all limitations on the permissible 
height of buildings or the required ratio of buildings with “public func-
tions” were stripped away. The ease with which existing laws were being 
bypassed led to indignant reactions amongst the project’s opponents:
“[It started already with the] railway station, [which] is officially cul-
tural heritage. It was built in 1884. The facade is protected. So, it’s im-
possible to put anything on that facade because it’s protected. But they 
built an enormous, gigantic commercial billboard [in front of it]. So, I, 
as a member of the assembly, I asked: ‘how is it possible?’ Where are the 
inspectors? Where are the police?”
“Eagle Hills is a private, commercial company. So, you know, they just 
ignore the law. The city ignores the rules of the city. Any other private 
company would have had big problems to find advertising space. You 
know it’s [usually] very expensive, it’s very difficult to find a place, and 
they [just came and] have this... So, there is no law in this country, it’s 
the Wild West...” (Opposition politician, City Assembly).
Both activists and architects emphasised that they were not necessar-
ily against foreign investment – stating that there is a conspicuous con-
trast between an investor who manages to comply with local laws and one 
that just benefits from close ties with local political elites. The initial lack 
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of clarity and transparency regarding the amount of public money that 
was involved in the project was repeatedly highlighted as a major concern. 
This contributed significantly to rumours that BW was either a big confi-
dence trick that naïve politicians were unaware of, or that it was a mecha-
nism through which they could eventually enrich themselves:
“All investments are welcome, we don’t have enough investors here, of 
course we need international investors, they’re welcome.... But we can-
not be a part of contemporary Europe if we do not respect the rule of 
law” (Municipal Urban Planner).
“There is no development without investment, so let’s be clear about 
that... But you have to make it transparent, you have to have a system 
that defends your rights, the rights of the citizens. And that’s what never 
happens here. I mean, you have the system of laws and you have the 
investor and then you change the laws, you’re not defending the interest 
of the people who vote for you” (Activist 2).
“They are going to have a contract, which is still secret, we don’t know 
anything about the contract. So, I suppose that Belgrade has the obliga-
tion to prepare the site, for such large costs, and we are not going to be 
able to fulfil that and they’re going to sue us, to get some extra money. 
And to share that with the government, and that’s the idea.” (Municipal 
Urbanist).
4. Mutual mystifications?
A contract was indeed signed in April 2015 by the Serbian Minister 
of Construction, Traffic and Infrastructure, Zorana Mihajlović, and the 
Chair of the Managing Board of Eagle Hills, Mohamed Alabbar, who 
simultaneously represented Belgrade Waterfront Capital Investment 
LLC (the “Strategic Partner”), Al Maabar International Investment LLC 
(the “Guarantor”), and the Belgrade Waterfront Company (a re-branded 
name for what used to be the local subsidiary of Eagle Hills). This con-
tract was, seemingly as a result of increased public pressure, made pub-
licly available a few months later (Joint Venture Agreement – Belgrade 
Waterfront Project, 2015). It mainly contains information about how the 
newly established “public-private”1 Belgrade Waterfront Company is or-
ganised. While the legal and operational details of this contract are more 
extensively discussed by Grubbauer & Čamprag (2019) and Koelemaij 
(2018) respectively, the most important thing to note here is that the 
project does not contain even close to €3.5 billion of direct investment 
1 Although, the usage of the notion “public-private” is somewhat tricky here as it was 
admitted to be mainly a government-to-government agreement, see also Section 5.
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and that it will be developed in multiple phases, whereby the Republic of 
Serbia is responsible for preparation of all basic utility infrastructure and 
services, while the “Strategic Partner” is responsible for development of 
the project in co-operation with a select number of partner companies. 
An example of the latter is the US-based “global architectural company” 
RTKL, which was repeatedly mentioned as responsible for designing 
BW’s “master plan”.
When we discussed increasing concerns regarding the project’s lack 
of transparency with two managers at Eagle Hills (later the Belgrade Wa-
terfront Company), both of Serbian origin and with degrees in interna-
tional business and finance from US universities, their reaction was two-
fold. Firstly, placing at the forefront the logic of markets as an impersonal 
force regulating their work (West, 2017), they asserted that many details 
were deliberately kept secret precisely because they had to adapt rapidly 
to “a fast-changing market”. Secondly, they admitted that it may as well 
be better for public opinion concerning the project if they revealed more 
details about their plans. This eventually happened to an extent when the 
contract was later made public. They did, however, also acknowledge that 
most of the main decisions came from the Eagle Hills head office in Abu 
Dhabi and that thus they did not always have that much impact on the 
way the project was being implemented – although they did emphasise 
continuous interaction with Abu Dhabi. This was also carefully admitted 
by the Belgrade Mayor’s Chief of Staff, who simultaneously holds a posi-
tion on the Supervisory Board of the Belgrade Waterfront Company (even 
though it is a “project at the state level”) and who explains that “only me 
and Siniša Mali were there from the beginning and are therefore 100 per-
cent acquainted with the project”:
“We are not dealing with that (advertising campaign), it’s an investor-
story you know... they provide the finance and they’re taking care of 
the project, because that’s something that they do the best, you know. 
We cannot do that... But it’s... Now, you have (the situation) that the 
government is defending the project more than the investor itself, you 
know...” (Mayor’s Office Chief of Staff).
While he did acknowledge that this limited decision-making power 
was sometimes a bit frustrating, he also accepted and justified these un-
even power relations by stating:
“That is investor-urbanism... ...In this kind of world, you have multi-
national companies, big companies that have businesses all over the 
world. They already have that knowledge, you know, they have that 
know-how” (Mayor’s Office Chief of Staff).
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As a counter-accusation to the allegation that Serbian government in-
stitutions were too secretive about the project, it was rather contradictori-
ly, repeatedly stated that critics of the project continually and deliberately 
“mystified” things:
“...it’s again, that mystification, you know. It [would be a] problem for 
[every] single investor in the world, to invest only in equity. Now [we 
have] one [that] is investing in equity in that amount...[Normally] when 
you have a real estate project, you will go into classic project financing, 
you are going to the banks, and tell them ‘ok, this is what I have’. But 
for political reasons, and we know how people are going to [perceive 
that as if] ‘we were selling our land for not even a dime’, but we are not 
selling, we are leasing it, but when we show that to them they go like ‘ok 
but that’s the same’. It’s not the same! Then of course, when you build 
real estate, you will offer apartments for pre-sale, [...] it’s normal, you 
know, it’s business, it’s everyday business things, you know... But people 
don’t know that, they will always mystify something” (Mayor’s Office 
Chief of Staff).
The aforementioned Eagle Hills representatives also argued that their 
biggest challenge was to “create a belief amongst the people”, since accord-
ing to them, “there was a lack of knowledge in Serbia about how present-
day business is conducted.” According to them, people still relied too 
much on the state to look after them, and they should accept that “changes 
in the law are necessary for the international property market” and that 
“nations should be competitive with their tax and visa-regimes.” In order 
to create some trust and constancy regarding the project, Eagle Hills de-
cided to open a publicly accessible exhibition space as an advertisement 
for the project, right next to the future construction site. For this purpose, 
they renovated a dilapidated building, making it possible for supporters of 
the project to claim that “in a few years time, this whole part of Belgrade 
will look as beautiful as this”. They also launched an immense advertising 
campaign as a “legitimizing” strategy that imbues the public with what 
one researcher recently termed “affective promise” (Dekeyser, 2018). Fur-
thermore, the civil servants, politicians and private actors who defended 
the project all emphasized that Alabbar and his other company “Emaar 
Properties” had a very reliable reputation across the globe:
“Look at what happened in 2007, when we had the global financial cri-
sis. Many investors worldwide pulled back their investments, but Emaar 
did not, they kept their promises” (Mayor’s Office Chief of Staff).
Another common message amongst the executives of the project was 
that they continuously downplayed its size or significance, emphasizing 
that the project was in fact “nothing special”. Neither within the context of 
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Belgrade, since “the development of Novi Beograd was a lot bigger” (Acting 
Director, Belgrade Land Development Public Agency), nor internationally:
“Because Emaar, the company that is managed by Mr. Alabbar, in 2000-
and... I think that was 14... they had 52 projects all around the world... A 
new one being launched every week. In one year, 60+ billion of invest-
ments for just that team. So, it’s not that we [in Belgrade] are something 
special, something that they are not used to do... So, it is not something 
that was happening because, you know, someone was whispering in the 
sheikh’s ear or something... No, these guys are developing mainly in Af-
rica, and I think also in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and so on. So those are 
their main projects, and we are just one of them, so...” (Mayor’s Office 
Chief of Staff).
In the next section, we will take a closer look at the power relations 
behind the early implementation process of BW, supplemented by insights 
that were acquired through interviews with real estate development ex-
perts in the UAE. These subsequently also allow us to reflect on the why 
questions, or the incentives that lie behind the project and have caused so 
much controversy.
5. Rationales and Relationalities
If BW can indeed be categorised as “unexceptional” in any way what-
soever, this can only be because other transnational real estate develop-
ment projects operated by UAE-based companies are equally lacking in 
transparency. Based on online research and interviews conducted with 
real estate development experts, we have found that many of those trans-
national schemes are actually not as “big” or as “successful” as the Mayor’s 
Office Chief of Staff assured us. Although multiple respondents in Abu 
Dhabi and Dubai did acknowledge Alabbar’s “cleverness” in many ways, 
they also assured us that his transnational activities were in fact rather 
experimental:
“What they did is that they formed a new company called Eagle Hills. 
So, Eagle Hills is a master developer, based out of Abu Dhabi, it’s effec-
tively [the] Abu Dhabi Government, “royal family money”... It’s run by 
Alabbar and he’s doing exactly the same as he did with Emaar Interna-
tional... He’s doing huge schemes, all over the world and, so far, he’s been 
making a complete mess of it” (Real Estate Development Consultant).
Later in the same interview, the respondent further explained why 
he thought many transnational real estate development projects by UAE-
based companies were failing:
60 | Jorn Koelemaij and Stefan Janković
“Alabbar tries to apply Dubai principles to his projects. And those pro-
jects do not work the way that Dubai works. You know, in Dubai or 
Abu Dhabi, if he wants to get consent, he will just go ahead, and Emaar 
will go ahead, and they will go and start building, even though they 
haven’t got a building permit” (Real Estate Development Consultant).
Additionally, several UAE-based real estate development consult-
ants who we interviewed also highlighted the fact that feasibility studies, 
which should always be the starting point of a development project, were 
frequently not taken too seriously when it came to transnational activi-
ties. According to the experts, another reason why many of them have 
not been very successful in the past – apart from unexpected political re-
gime changes or the global financial crisis – is that it is extremely difficult 
to successfully develop a project while retaining the main command and 
control function at a headquarters in Abu Dhabi and without having a 
solid team on location.
As we have already shown, this corresponds to statements by local 
representatives of Eagle Hills (the BW Company) who we interviewed. Al-
though they were of course involved in the project’s implementation, the 
main decisions continued to come “from above” – i.e. from Abu Dhabi. 
Whilst the local representatives firmly and repeatedly stressed that the 
primary motives behind the project were economic, explaining that it 
“would attract the wealthy Serbian diaspora”, and that the “psychology of 
people is similar everywhere, so we will build it and they will come”, our 
respondents from the UAE almost unanimously argued that transnational 
projects were instead mainly driven by political motives. During the early 
implementation phase of BW, some journalists revealed that the project 
is not self-contained and that it is part of a wider bilateral agreement that 
also includes deals in other sectors (e.g. Wright, 2015). This was also, al-
beit a little hesitantly, alluded to by the Mayor’s Office Chief of Staff:
“Just so you understand, it was G to G business... Government to gov-
ernment. We have those... bilateral agreements, signed with them” 
(Mayor’s Office Chief of Staff).
These findings tell us a lot about the actual motives behind the pro-
ject. Despite on-going rhetoric on economic incentives, such as “providing 
jobs”, “attracting creative businesses” and “increase Belgrade’s internation-
al competitiveness”, the motives do indeed seem to have been mainly po-
litical and geopolitical (see also Barthel & Vignal, 2014 and Büdenbender 
& Golubchikov, 2017 respectively). The developer, being ostensibly private 
while possessing close social and financial ties with the government in 
Abu Dhabi, operates across scales, selectively co-operating with a growth 
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coalition including international consultancy firms as well as local and na-
tional-level politicians, civil servants and companies in Serbia. Although 
the investors do of course hope to realise some return on their investment 
into BW, it is clear that other bilateral agreements are a more attractive 
part of the portfolio. Furthermore, UAE elites aim to expand geographi-
cally to gain and maintain legitimacy and visibility or, in other words, to 
increase their “symbolic capital” in order to “stay on the map” (see also: 
Wippel et al., 2014).
For Serbian political elites, the project also clearly serves to assert 
their power position. Despite all the controversies and resistance regard-
ing the project, Vučić was re-elected in 2017, indicating that a large pro-
portion of the electorate continues to have faith in him. In a way, BW can 
be regarded as a scale-making project for the Vučić administration. Since 
his party, SNS2, currently holds a majority position in both the national 
and the city assemblies, they are able to “move” actors from one level to 
another with relative ease. This is for instance illustrated by the Mayor’s 
Office’s Chief of Staff ’s simultaneous role of being on the Belgrade Wa-
terfront Company’s Supervisory board or the former Mayor of Belgrade, 
Siniša Mali, who recently became the Minister of Finance. Furthermore, 
the fact that Mali has travelled across the globe to promote the BW model 
and advertise the pre-sale of BW apartments also implies that the project 
enables “them” to build on their symbolic capital in the arena of the global 
wealth elite.
At the same time, however, the international attention the project 
has attracted has also inflicted some harm to their image. Due to the fact 
that some of the members of the Ne da(vi)mo Beograd activist initiative 
are also involved in global activist networks, such as INURA or DiEM25, 
the top-down and rather authoritarian way in which BW is being imple-
mented has been condemned by members of the European Parliament. 
Particularly in April 2016, when several buildings on Hercegovačka street 
(part of the future construction site) were demolished overnight by a 
group of unknown, masked men (Zaštitnik građana, 2016). Unsurprising-
ly, these events further galvanised resistance against the project, resulting 
in increasing numbers of people attending Ne Da(vi)mo Beograd’s dem-
onstrations in the following weeks (see more in the chapters by Jelisaveta 
Petrović and Mladen Nikolić in this volume). Conversely, BW has also ap-
peared to be a scale-making project through which Ne da(vi)mo Beograd 
has been able to gain symbolic and political capital. Their movement has 
since grown into a political party that participated in the municipal elec-
tions in early 2018. Clearly this story does not end there.
2 Srpska napredna stranka [Serbian Progressive Party]
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Conclusion
At the time of writing, the first two residential towers (the BW Resi-
dences complex) have just been completed, two more towers (the BW Vis-
ta complex) and the shopping mall (BW Gallery) are under construction, 
while sites for several further buildings are being prepared. This chapter 
has focused on a variety of events that occurred during two years of the 
early implementation phase of this large-scale real estate development 
project – a project that has attracted widespread attention and which con-
tinues to cause a great deal of controversy. We have adopted an approach 
that has allowed us to focus on the role of agency, as well as the mutual 
relationalities between the most prominent actors on and behind the pro-
ject’s “frontline”. This methodological strategy enables us to critically en-
gage with contemporary debates regarding state rescaling and world city 
entrepreneurialism, as well as discussing the stated rationales and moti-
vations behind similar controversial, speculative real estate development 
projects. For that reason, we would like to encourage others to persist in 
conducting follow-up research that could further elaborate on our insights 
and analyses. We continue to hope that the “mist” still currently obscuring 
Belgrade Waterfront and its “frontline” will eventually lift.
First, we can conclude that world city entrepreneurial practices, par-
ticularly those falling outside the so-called Euro-American context, are of-
ten initiated and facilitated by central governments rather than local ones. 
While the political elites backing such projects try to justify them mainly 
by relying on economic advertising jargon that relates to “boosting” the 
future urban economy, they are actually boosting and asserting their own 
symbolic power position through experimental development schemes that 
are primarily “meant to impress”. Adding the layer of transnationalism to 
this theoretical concept opens up another dimension regarding the politi-
cal and geopolitical incentives behind the scenes. On the basis of our re-
search, we state that transnational real estate developments are often gov-
ernment to government agreements and that they cannot be understood 
as stand-alone projects. In other words, they seem to be a part of wider 
bilateral agreements or strategic political decisions. While geo-economics 
and geo-politics frequently co-exist, the latter appears to dominate.
A second conclusion that we want to emphasise is that a project like 
BW can serve elites by being a scale-making project, in that it allows the 
main actors to operate across and “jump between” different scales in or-
der to extend their coalitions and thus their actual power. Although the 
decision-making processes behind BW appears, at first sight, to indicate 
scalar hierarchies where a “global” investor makes the decisions that are 
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then executed by national-level politicians and civil servants at the ex-
pense of the existing plans and ideas of local-level policy-makers and civic 
society groups, our analysis illustrates that this is not the whole story. It 
has proved to be the case that those actors who are able to “jump scales”, 
including the opponents of the plan, are in fact the ones who possess the 
most political and strategic capital. Along with Leon (2017) and other 
critical scholars who have discussed urban entrepreneurialism in the spirit 
of David Harvey, we can therefore also confirm the statement that world 
city entrepreneurial projects significantly reinforce class relations.
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